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Abstrak
Konstruksieprojekte word deur kliënte as suksesvol beskou slegs wanneer hulle
strategiese doelwitte bereik is. Daar word beweer dat die keuse van ’n
bepaalde kontraktuele ooreenkoms die bereiking van sodanige doelwitte
moontlik kan belemmer. Ontleding van die South African JBCC Principal
Building Agreement deur die outeurs het hulle ondersoek na die wyse waarop
kontraktuele reëlings moontlik die bereiking van die kliënt se
konstrukiseverwante strategiese doelwitte mag beperk, ondersteun. Die
navorsingsmetodiek ten opsigte van hierdie navorsing toegepas, behels ’n
tekstuele ontleding van die JBCC en een gevallestudie om die wyse waarop
die JBCC Principal Building Agreement teoreties en prakties die kliënt se
strategiese doelwitte aanspreek, te ondersoek. Die bevindinge dui aan dat
die Agreement nòg voorsiening maak om die kliënt se strategiese doelwitte te
bevredig nòg voldoen die filosofie, struktuur of parameters van hierdie
ooreenkoms aan sodanige doelwitte nie. Die gevolgtrekking is dat kliënte wat
van hierdie of ’n soortgelyke ooreenkoms gemaksonthalwe of omrede die
bekendheid daarvan gebruikmaak, behoort die toereikendheid daarvan al
dan nie om strategiese doelwitte rakende belegging en bedryfsaspekte in die
breë sin van die konstruksieprojek te bestuur, te oorweeg. 
Sleutelwoorde: JBCC, strategiese doelwitte, bedryfsaspekte, konstruksie kliënt,
kontraktuele reëling, Suid-Afrika.
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1. Introduction
Construction works are procured for strategic reasons: houses,for example, are built to provide shelter from the elements,factories are built to accommodate the manufacturing
processes of industry, public amenities are built to provide
community services, and commercial developments are undertaken
by property developers for sale or investment. The strategic
objectives for construction, therefore, can be broadly defined in
terms of the needs of the construction client in relation to his or her
ultimate use of it upon completion. Classification of the strategic
objectives of construction in this manner, however, does not
complete the set of strategic objectives for construction. In recent
years, for example, the socio-economic context of construction has
given rise to a second order of objectives for strategic ends, which
have come to be applied to each stage of the development cycle
of the built environment, namely:
• urban planning and development;
• project design;
• the manufacture of building materials and products;
• building construction and processes; 
• maintenance and management of the built environment;
and
• deconstruction and reinstatement of the environment,
after the construction works have served their purpose
(Ofori, 1998; Hill et al., 2002).
Strategic objectives aligned with the development cycle of the built
environment are premised upon the argument that construction
works (i.e. infrastructure and buildings) should benefit society not only
by their existence but also by the economic activity generated in the
process of delivery (Drewer, 1975; Ofori, 1980; Edmunds & Miles, 1984;
Wells, 1986; Rwelamila & Meyer, 1996).
The strong functionalist approach of construction, therefore, which in
the past focussed more on project delivery, and which was
measured by hard criteria like time, cost, quality and utility, has thus
undergone a shift to create a balance by a more interpretive
approach designed to:
• address poverty and inequity based on the redistribution
of opportunity;
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• substitute natural to human made capital; 
• ensure the carrying capacity of supporting eco-systems;
and
• maintain the performance, quality and service life of
construction works (IUCN, 1980; Solow, 1993; Gladwin et
al.,1995, all cited by Hill & Bowen, 1997). 
These objectives relate specifically to the pillars of sustainable
construction identified respectively as the social ‘pillar’, the
economic ‘pillar’, the biophysical ‘pillar’, and the technical ‘pillar’ of
sustainable development (Hill & Bowen, 1997).
In view of the above, the strategic nature of construction raises two
pertinent issues:
• the manner in which construction works are procured;
and
• the measures applied to determine project success. 
These activities are linked.
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which the JBCC
Principal Building Agreement facilitates the management (and
hence attainment) of clients’ strategic objectives. 
2. Research methodology
A review of the literature shows that the strategic objectives of
construction are well understood in procurement theory (Hibberd,
1991; Green 1994; Rwelamila & Hall, 1994; Jennings & Kenley, 1996;
Lenard & Moshini, 1998; Rowlinson & McDermott, 1999), and
procurement systems (Franks, 1984; Sharif & Morledge, 1994;
Masterman, 1997; Hamilton, 2001). A large body of literature also
exists to assist the procurement specialist in advising the construction
client on which procurement system is best suited to the client’s
individual need (e.g. Love & Skitmore, 1996; Ofori, 1996; Masterman,
1997; Kumaraswamy & Dissanayaka, 1998; Murray & Langford, 1998).
The advice, however, appears useful only up to a point. For example,
with the exception of Cox (1996, 1997), Cox & Thompson (1998), and
Cox & Townsend (1998), nothing could be found on the best choice
of supply relationship to be concluded between the construction
client and the contractor, given the asset specificity of the
contractor’s service (i.e. residual, complementary or strategic) to the
construction client in the realisation of its objectives related the
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investment/business case; nor was there any guidance on how to
establish the necessary links between the supply relationship and the
form of contract consistent with such objectives; and nor was there
any direction on the choice of performance criteria and measures
needed in the contract to manage and control supply chain
resources activities sufficient to achieve objectives critical to the
success of the project.
The review of the literature was undertaken thematically within the
context of the application of theory to the realisation of strategic
objectives in relation to a ‘separated’ and ‘coordinated’ (i.e. the
traditional or conventional) system of procurement. This was done in
order to narrow the area of investigation. Using a framework derived
from the literature, the study proceeded with a desk-top analysis of
the JBCC Principal Building Agreement (2005) to understand the
characteristics of the Agreement in terms of:
• the premise of its supply relationship;
• the division of roles and responsibilities between the
parties;
• the structure of the control system and its inherent
strengths and weaknesses; 
• performance criteria and measures; 
• the distribution of risk; and
• the reimbursement mechanism. 
The desk-top analysis was followed by a field study of a single building
project to determine how the Agreement directs practice for the
realisation of strategic objectives related to the investment/business
case of a particular project.
The research was not hypothesis driven as there was no intention to
prove or disprove any particular theories about strategy or the
management and control of strategic objectives in the contractual
arrangements of construction projects. It was more concerned with
seeking to augment a theory of practice for the management and
control of strategic objectives within the context of a ‘separate and
coordinated’ (i.e. traditional or conventional) procurement system
using the particular contractual arrangement of the JBCC Principal
Building Agreement (2005). The methodology adopted, therefore,
was evaluation research with a strong descriptive focus.
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Internal validity was achieved by explanation-building from
inferences drawn from the data collected, making every effort to
ensure that evidence was convergent and that all rival explanations
and possibilities were adequately considered (Yin, 1994). Care was
also taken to ensure a proper fit between the concepts (issues)
involved and their measures (Edwards, 2001, citing Bryman, 1988).
External validity in the traditional sense (i.e. the capacity to generalise
findings beyond the context of the case itself to a larger universe of
cases based on a ‘statistical’ generalisation) was not possible to
achieve as only one case study was undertaken. The study, however,
did focus on generalising the particular set of results to the broader
theory of procurement based on a process of ‘analytical’
generalisation (Yin, 1994). The study, therefore, may be defined as
‘instrumental’ case study research (Edwards, 2003), as the case was
undertaken to facilitate an understanding of the management and
control of the processes affecting the outcome of strategic
objectives in the contractual arrangements of construction projects
procured under a ‘separated and coordinated’ (i.e. traditional or
conventional) system using a particular contract form.
The research questions posed were thus:
• How are the strategic objectives of construction clients
met and controlled in the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement?; and
• How do the performance criteria of the JBCC Principal
Building Agreement contribute to the measurement of
strategic objectives at project completion?
Operational links were intrinsic to both questions and it was this issue
that constituted the rationale for choosing a case study design.
3. Desk-top analysis of the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement
An analysis of the JBCC Principal Building Agreement shows that it is
intended for use only to procure the construction works. The nature of
the service to be rendered by the contractor is thus defined merely
as ‘the execution of the works’ (Cl. 2.1). The act of ‘execution’ of the
works in the Agreement is defined by two events: ‘commencement’
(Cl. 15.3) and ‘completion’ (Clause 15.3.2; 15.3.3 and 15.3.4), which is
required to be carried out “with due skill, diligence, regularity and
expedition ….” (Cl. 15.3) to the building standards as may be
stipulated by the principal agent from time to time (Cl. 24.1.1). This
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description demarcates not only the extent of the service to be
rendered by the contractor, but also the limit of the contractor’s
focus for management and control, and the measures it will no
doubt apply to evaluate project success.
3.1 Procurement system
The limitation of the contractor’s service to the execution of the works
only implies that the Agreement is premised on the ‘separate and
coordinated’ (i.e. traditional/conventional) procurement system,
and all the assumptions of procurement strategy that its use too
would necessarily imply (Masterman, 1997). Where the construction
client’s strategic objectives cannot be met by the use of this
particular procurement system, the Agreement would itself therefore
be an immediate barrier from the outset. This comment is made all
the more relevant by the fact of the wide use of the JBCC Principal
Building Agreement as an industry standard in South Africa without
due consideration of the investment / business case drivers that may
warrant the use of an alternative procurement system and thus a
more appropriate form of contract. Research in South Africa
indicates that little attempt is made by the professional team to
match procurement system characteristics with client objectives.
Indeed, a significant proportion of professional advisors admit to a
less than fulsome understanding of the characteristics of these
alternative systems (Bowen et al., 1999).
3.2 Contractual control mechanisms
3.2.1 Division of roles and responsibilities
3.2.1.a) The Employer
Under the JBCC Principal Building Agreement (2005), the employer
has extremely limited powers. Having entered into contract by
mutual agreement with the contractor, the employer has the power
to:
i. appoint the principal agent (Cl.5.1);
ii. appoint agents as stated in the schedule, and may
appoint further agents with the contractor being informed
thereof (Cl.5.2); 
iii. recover penalties for non-completion (Cl.30.1);
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iv. cancel the contract in the event of the contractor’s
default (Cl. 36.1) or by reason of destruction to the works,
or the destruction of an existing building to which the
works is intended to apply, howsoever caused (Cl. 37.1);
and
v. recover damages, in appropriate circumstances (Cl.
36.5.8).
In respect of the first item listed above, it should be noted that
appointment of the principal agent and other agents stated in the
Schedule (Cls. 5.1.1; 5.2 or 5.4) is a material term of contract. The
employer, therefore, cannot act directly on his or her own behalf in
the management of the contract. This issue often proves problematic
in practice. 
Failure to effect the appointments of the principal agent or other
agents stated in the schedule, or to replace them should they be
unable to act or cease to be agents, entitles the contractor to
cancel the contract (Cl.38.1.1). The remedy, however, may be too
drastic, except, for example, where the contractor believes that non-
appointment will cause extreme prejudice. It is submitted, therefore,
that a more appropriate remedy, if required, should be the
suspension of the works by the contractor until the employer has
fulfilled his or her obligations in this regard. No such relief, however, is
available to the contractor in terms of the Agreement.
Further roles of the employer not addressed by the Agreement, but
which are required by the South African Constitution and other
statutory legislation include the employer’s role in:
• The protection of the environment (see the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, Act No.108 of 1996: Sect. 24)
(Republic of South Africa, 1996); and
• Issues of occupational health and safety under the
Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993)
(Republic of South Africa, 1993) to be performed in terms
of the Regulations published in the Government Gazette
(No. 25207 of 2003) (Department of Labour, 2003).
The environmental concerns of development during the planning
and design stages of a construction project are addressed in terms of
the Regulations published in the South African Government Gazette
(No. 18261 of 1997) (Department of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism, 1997), as derived from the Environment Conservation Act
(No. 73 of 1989) (Republic of South Africa, 1989). Implementation of
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Environment Management Systems (EMS) for the management and
control of construction activities are not yet mandatory in South
Africa but guidance does exist in terms of the Code of Practice for
Environmental Management Systems published by the South African
Bureau of Standards (SABS, 1993) and the international specification
for EMS developed by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO, 1995).
3.2.1.b) The principal agent
The authority of the principal agent under the Agreement does not
follow the common law rules of agency in South Africa in all respects.
An agent under South African law is normally required to carry out his
or her mandate in accordance with the full instruction, or under the
direct commission, of his/her employer (Hosten et al., 1983). The
principal agent, in terms of the Agreement, however, enjoys wide
discretionary powers and may, in accordance with this discretion,
exercise his or her judgement independently. Moreover, interference
by the employer in the independent exercise of the agent’s duties
may found a claim by the contractor against the employer for
damages, or even entitle the contractor to cancel the contract if the
interference causes the contractor prejudice (Cl. 38.1.7#). (Note: The
principal agent enjoys no such discretion in terms of this clause under
contracts concluded by the State, and the contractor’s rights in this
regard too fall away). 
The effect of this arrangement means that the principal agent
cannot be held accountable for his or her actions as an agent
entirely on the strength of his or her mandate. The employer therefore
can seldom, if ever, bring a successful action in contract but can only
seek a remedy on the basis of delict (Hosten et al., 1983). This is
because it is not inconceivable that the terms of the principal agent’s
mandate may be such as to give the employer a contractual
remedy against him or her on particular facts without contravening
the terms of the Agreement. This arrangement greatly weakens the
control the employer may exercise, inter alia, over the management
of strategic objectives.
Other than the powers retained by the employer as listed above
under item 3.2.1.a), the employer surrenders all of his/her other
powers to the principal agent, who is ‘the only person who shall have
the authority to bind the employer, except where agents issue
contract instructions under delegated authority’ (Cl. 5.3). For
example, it is only the principal agent who may:
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i. Issue contract instructions (Cl. 17.1);
ii. Permit work to be executed and installed by others for
whom the contractor is not responsible (Cl. 22.1);
iii. Give the contractor interpretations and guidance on the
standard and state of the completion of the works (Cl.
24.1);
iv. Issue certificates of practical completion (Cl. 24.3.1), works
completion (Cl. 25.2.1), and final completion (Cl. 26.3.1#);
Note: A certificate of final completion is deemed
conclusive evidence as to the sufficiency of the works and
that the conractor’s obligations under the Agreement
have been met, other than for latent defects (Cl. 26.6)
v. Extend the construction period in certain circumstances
(Cl. 29.7);
vi. Determine the amounts of payments to be made under
an interim (Cl. 31.1) or final payment certificate (Cl. 34.5);
vii. Determine adjustments to the contract value (Cl. 32.1);
viii. Calculate the monies recoverable by the employer for
penalties (Cl. 33.1.1); default interest (Cl.33.1.2), and
expense and loss in terms of Clause 33.2 (Cl. 33.1.3); 
ix. Settle disagreements and disputes between the employer
or his/her agents on the one hand and the contractor on
the other that arise out of the Agreement (Cl.40.1), save
those that are referred to adjudication (Cl. 40.2.1#);
mediation (Cl. 40.7) or arbitration (Cl. 40.5#);
x. Approve subcontract work (Cls. 24.3.1; 25.2.1 and 26.2.1 of
the JBCC Nominated / Selected Subcontract Agreement
(2005);
xi. Determine adjustments to the subcontract value (Cl. 32.1
of the Subcontract Agreement); and
xii. Determine the amount to be paid to a subcontractor
under an interim (Cl. 31.0 of the Subcontract Agreement)
or final payment certificate (Cl. 34.5 of the Subcontract
Agreement).
All these powers granted to the principal agent are exercised without
any contractual liability for the performance of its duties under the
Agreement for the works. The reason for this is that the contract for
the works is concluded between the employer and the contractor.
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The principal agent is not party to its terms and is thus not ‘privy’ to it
(Hosten et al., 1983). He or she is merely afforded powers under the
Agreement to govern the contract. The principal agent’s
responsibilities are regulated by a separate contract of agreement
concluded with the employer to act in a supervisory capacity. The
principal agent’s contractual responsibilities, therefore, are
disconnected from the Agreement for the works. There is thus a
complete separation of the principal agent’s duty from the very basis
of his/her responsibility and accountability.
3.2.2 Management of transactional behaviour
The instruments used to manage transactional behaviour under the
Principal Agreement include:
i. security for due performance;
ii. penalties for non-completion of the works;
iii. rights of ‘set-off’; and
iv. certain mechanisms for the management of conflict.
3.2.2.a) Security for due performance
In terms of the Agreement, the contractor may elect to provide the
employer with either a ‘variable’ or ‘fixed’ construction guarantee
(Cl.14.3 or Cl.14.4 respectively) as security for due performance. The
purpose of the security is to furnish the employer with a ready means
to satisfy partially any loss that it may sustain through a breach of
contract by the contractor. Typically, this could include, late
completion of the works, failure by the contractor to complete the
works (which may necessitate the engagement of others to do so), or
refusal by the contractor to re-do defective work, again
necessitating the employment of others to make good the defects
(Finsen, 2005). It should be noted that payments made by the
guarantor to the employer in terms of the construction guarantee do
not prejudice the rights of the employer or the contractor under the
Agreement (Cl. 14.6).
The merits of the different kinds of guarantee are beyond the scope
of this article but may be considered by referring to Finsen (2005).
What is important to note, however, is that the construction
guarantee is restricted to the payment of money and that it is
payable at call (Cl. 14.3.4 or 14.4.5). The employer, therefore, is not
put to the inconvenience of having to prove his or her loss before
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receiving payment. The apparent simplicity of the process of
recovery, however, is not so easily realised in practice. 
Should the contractor fail to elect a form of security contemplated
by the Agreement within (21) twenty one days of the acceptance of
the tender, the employer may cancel the agreement (Cl. 14.7.2), or
alternatively may ‘hand over the site to the contractor and withhold
payment from the contractor until the amount withheld is equal in
value to (10%) ten percent of the contract sum’ (Cl. 14.7.1). The
money thus withheld is deemed to be a cash deposit although, in this
instance, the employer would be under no obligation to hold it in an
interest bearing account (Finsen, 2005).
All forms of security place the employer in a very strong position of
control as he or she is not required to exercise the common-law
remedy of placing the contractor into insolvency, at least in respect
of the recovery of amounts up to the value of the security. It is
submitted that claims for damages beyond the value of the
guarantee or cash deposit, however, must be recovered through the
courts.
3.2.2.b) Penalties
Damages as a remedy for breach of contract are recompense for
non-performance. They are, therefore, not intended to recompense
the innocent party for his/her loss, but to put in him or her in a position
he or she would have been if the contract had been properly
performed (Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co. Ltd v Consolidated
Langlaagte Mines Ltd. 1915 AD 1). The courts, therefore, subject to
certain qualifications, are concerned only with the financial position
of the innocent party. For this reason, damages need to be proved
otherwise none will be awarded (Christie, 2006). This, however, is not
the case with penalties agreed between the parties to a contract
since the enactment in South Africa of the Conventional Penalties
Act (No. 15 of 1962) (Republic of South Africa, 1962). Penalties do not
have to be an accurate pre-estimate of the damages likely to be
suffered, nor are they limited to a consideration of the financial loss
likely to be suffered by the employer. Penalties may include
‘everything that can reasonably be considered to harm or hurt, or be
calculated to harm or hurt a creditor in his property, his person, his
reputation, his work, his activities, his convenience, his mind or in an
way interferes with his rightful interests as a result of the act or omission
of the debtor’ (Van Staden v Central South African Land and Mines
1969 (4) SA 349 (W), cited by Finsen, 2005: 144).
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Today, therefore, it is not uncommon for parties to an agreement to
include a term in the contract which binds one party to pay a fixed
sum of money (a penalty) in committing a specified breach or
perhaps any breach of the contract. As mentioned above, the
Conventional Penalties Act regulates penalty provisions included in
contracts. The most significant points of regulation being that where
explicit provision is made for a penalty, the innocent party may not
also claim damages for the same breach, nor the recovery of
damages in lieu of the penalty, ‘except where the relevant contract
expressly so provides’ (S 2(1)). The second point of significance is that
the courts may reduce the amount of the penalty if it appears to be
excessive (S 3).
Provision is made under the Agreement for a penalty to be paid to
the employer in the event of ‘non-completion’ of the works by the
date for practical completion stated in the Schedule, or by such
revised date as may have been determined for practical completion
by the principal agent (Cl. 30.0). The penalty, therefore, relates only
to the loss of time under the Agreement. 
One may interpret from the provision for a penalty in the event of
non-completion of the works that time is not the ‘essence’ of
contract under the Agreement, but merely ‘material’ from the point
of view of the employer who stands to suffer financial loss should the
works not be completed on time. In terms of the Agreement, the
penalty is calculated as a fixed sum per day for every day that the
works remains incomplete. 
The benefit of a penalty clause under the Agreement again is the
fact that the employer is not required to prove the extent of his/her
damages at law before making a claim against the contractor. The
principal agent shall merely calculate the penalty due from the date
of practical completion stipulated in the Schedule to the actual date
of practical completion (Cl. 30). The amount of such penalty shall be
reflected in the recovery statement and the amount due shall be
deducted against the payment certificate issued to the contractor
(Cl. 33.1.1 and Cl. 33.3).
Whereas the penalty provision under the Agreement generally acts
as a strong deterrent against the contractor not completing the
works on time, it is submitted that its effect does not necessarily
extend to all cases of non-completion. For example, construction
works of a relatively low value may nevertheless place the employer
at severe risk if not completed on time. A high penalty provision in
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such circumstances may make contractors hesitant to submit a price
for its execution, or they may merely include the amount of the
penalty in the tender, or an amount equal to their perception of the
risk to which they are exposed by contracting for the works.
Circumstances such as this may require the employer to forego the
mechanism of a penalty to control transactional behaviour, and
compel him/her rather to implement some other measure to
manage the risk in the interests of procuring the works within an
acceptable market budget. On the other hand, a low penalty,
which in itself may be an accurate pre-estimate of damages likely to
be suffered by the employer in the event of non-completion, serves
little or no purpose.
3.2.2.c)  Rights of ‘set-off’
The right of ‘set-off’ is a recognised principle in South African
common law (Schierhout v Union Government 1926 AD 286, cited by
Christie, 2006), and is thus not an extraordinary remedy for the
recovery for debts that are liquidated and fully due. The right can be
excluded by contract. The right of ‘set-off’, however, is not excluded
by an explicit contractual term under the Agreement and is,
therefore, available to both parties. It is submitted, however, that the
rights of ‘set-off’ are limited in scope to the explicit provisions
recorded in the Agreement. It should also be noted that the rights of
‘set-off’ between the parties are weakened by the fact that they are
placed under the governance and control of the principal agent
who is the only one who may deal with debts that arise between the
parties under the Agreement by way of ‘set-off’ (Cl. 33.3.1).
Items of expense and loss that the contractor may recover from the
employer are limited to:
• Compensatory interest (Cl. 33.1.4);
• Default interest (Cl. 33.1.5); and
• Damages arising out of the employer’s default and
cancellation of the contract by the contractor (Cl. 33.1.6);
and
• Advance payments (Cl. 33.1.7)
The employer’s rights of ‘set-off’ under the Agreement for the
recovery of loss and expense are much wider than that of the
contractor and include:
i. Penalties for non-completion (Cl. 33.1.1 and 30);
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ii. Default interest (Cl. 33.1.2 and Cl. 31.12);
iii. Insurance premiums paid which the contractor has failed
to remit (Cl. 33.2.1);
iv. The cost of engaging others to carry out contract
instructions which the contractor has failed to execute (Cl.
33.2.2);
v. Additional costs arising from the cancellation of a
nominated subcontract due to the default or insolvency
of the contractor (Cl. 33.2.3);
vi. Interest on any amount due by the contractor to the
employer in terms of a previous interim payment
certificate (Cl. 33.2.5); 
vii. The additional cost of completing the contract whether
the contract has been cancelled due to the default of the
contractor (Cl. 33.2.6);
viii. Amounts paid directly to nominated and selected
subcontractors on the failure of the contractor to make
such payments (Cl. 33.2.8); and
ix. Default by the contractor (presumably for any other loss or
expense incurred by the employer), subject to seven (7)
calendar days notice detailing such default has been
given prior to the issue of the next recovery statement in
order to allow the contractor the opportunity to remedy
such default (Cl. 33.2.7).
It is submitted that the scope of the employers rights of ‘set-off’ under
the Agreement provide a strong (albeit indirect) tool in the
management of the transactional behaviour of the contractor,
especially in view of the fact that the principal agent’s recovery
statement and accompanying payment certificate would provide
prima facie evidence of the extent of the loss and expense due for
recovery by the employer.
3.2.2.d)  Certain mechanisms for the management of conflict
In an effort to facilitate a structured process of negotiation, the
Agreement commences the dispute settlement process with the
need for a notification to be given in writing by the aggrieved party
to the respondent calling on the latter to resolve a ‘disagreement’
(Cl. 40.1). No procedures are given, however, on how to ensure
legitimacy of the nature of the disagreement, or on how to make
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sure that the disagreement is properly documented before referring
the matter up to the next level of management in both organisations,
and/or prior to third party determination. The wide ambit of the
clause, permitting ‘any disagreement’ between the parties being
the subject of notice (Cl 40.1), therefore, could lead to an abuse of
process
The Agreement provides no definition as to what constitutes a
disagreement and, added to the complexity of the wording, the
Agreement elevates a ‘disagreement’ to the level of a ‘dispute’ after
a lapse of a nominal period of 10 (ten) days from the date of
notification (Cl. 40.2). This elevation of status of a ‘disagreement’
takes place notwithstanding the linguistic difference between the
terms both in substance and subject matter (see Longman Dictionary
of Contemporary English, 1991; Concise Oxford English Dictionary,
2004) and makes the dispute now immediately subject to
adjudication by a third party (Cl. 40.2.1#). Although, by so doing, the
parties are not thereby deprived of their rights to resolve a dispute by
mediation at any time (Cl. 40.6#) 
Finsen (2005) in his interpretation of clause Cl. 40.1 around the issue of
a disagreement makes no clear distinction between the terms
‘disagreement’ and ‘dispute’, using them interchangeably, and cites
merely two decided cases which propose that a disagreement must
be a genuine disagreement, involving differing and conflicting points
of view held by the respective parties, and not merely a failure of one
of them to honour a contractual obligation. He argues, therefore,
that if the respondent maintained his/her silence on the matter it
cannot be said that a disagreement exists between the parties. The
aggrieved party, therefore, would be put to the inconvenience of
applying to court for a ruling in these circumstances. Finsen’s
argument is based on a proposition that a lack of ‘disagreement’
would prevent the issue from being brought within the scope of the
dispute-resolution clause. The authors, however, question this
interpretation in light of the most recent and authoritative English
decision on what constitutes a “dispute” and how it may be
construed to exist (Collins (Contractors) Ltd v Baltic Quay
Management (1994) Ltd [2005] BLR 63 CA 74). 
The next step available to the parties should the disagreement not be
resolved within a period of 10 (ten) days) is adjudication (Cl. 40.2.1#),
providing the parties did not agree otherwise at the time of contract
to proceed rather directly to arbitration (see Cl. 42.7.1 of the
schedule). A State employer, however, proceeds directly to litigation
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where a disagreement remains unresolved (see Cls. 40.2.1# and
40.2.2# read together). The further option to proceed to arbitration,
should the adjudication be challenged thus falls away in regard to
the State.
The process of adjudication is a dispute settlement mechanism
recently borrowed from English law and adopted in the Agreement
(Cl. 40.2.1#). The mechanism is also widely applied in other major
construction agreements used in South Africa (See FIDIC, NEC3 and
the 2002 edition of the GCC). The most obvious benefit of the
mechanism is that it is informal and thus quick and easy to apply,
providing speedy relief to the affected party. The JBCC Adjudication
Rules (2005) require the adjudicator to make a determination within
20 (twenty) working days, subject only to an extension of time of 10
(ten days) by mutual agreement between the parties (Rule 7.1.1). 
The weakness of the adjudication process in South Africa is that there
are no statutory provisions to enable a court to appoint an
adjudicator, where the parties themselves could not agree on the
appointment, nor to set aside the adjudicator’s appointment on the
grounds of bias or his determination for misconduct, nor to enforce
the adjudicator’s decision (Finsen, 2005). The other challenge of the
adjudication process is that the adjudicator determines an issue as an
expert and not as an arbitrator and can, therefore, be held
responsible for its result if the determination is defective and causes a
loss to either of the parties (Finsen, 2005). This may make it difficult to
appoint someone as an adjudicator in the absence of a formal
indemnity by the parties releasing him/her from such a consequence. 
For reasons not immediately evident in the Agreement, or from the
relevant literature, no obvious clarity exists on why the option of
litigation is reserved only where the State is the employer (Cl. 40.2.2).
The State, clearly, may prefer litigation for reasons of probity and
transparency in the event of a dispute affecting public funds. Private
sector clients, however, may also have strategic reasons for
preferring rights to litigation in the event of a failure to resolve a
dispute. These may well include, inter alia, the leverage it provides
over a supplier as a threat of a loss of confidentiality due to the public
nature of litigation, especially if the supplier is a public company or is
sensitive about its reputation due to past behaviour, or even as unfair
leverage, merely to retain the peril of a costly legal battle if disputes
are not speedily settled. There may, therefore, be sound reasons for
all parties, both public and private, to retain a right to litigation in the
interests of the investment/business case. 
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Arbitration in South Africa is regulated in terms of the Arbitration Act,
No. 42 of 1965. Arbitration as a mechanism of dispute settlement,
however, is not new. It has been practised since Roman times. A
comprehensive review of the merits and disadvantages of
arbitration, therefore, are beyond the scope of this article, other than
to mention a few points that determine its efficacy as a mechanism
to resolve disputes between contracting parties in South Africa, and
the scope of disagreements/disputes that may be referred to
arbitration under the Agreement. 
Provision is made in the Act for the courts to support and assist the
process of arbitration. The arbitrator’s award, therefore, is final and
binding unless otherwise ‘agreed’ by the parties (S 28) (Note: no such
‘agreement’ is provided for in the Agreement). The courts, therefore,
will not set aside the arbitrator’s award except in certain
circumstances (S 33). The scope of disagreements that may be
referred to arbitration under the Agreement include “…any
disagreement between the employer or his agents and the
contractor as to any matter arising out of or concerning this
agreement ….’’ (Cl.40.1), and “…. any disagreement between the
contractor and the subcontractor as to any matter arising out of this
n/s agreement ….” (Cl.40.1 of the JBCC Nominated / Selected
Subcontract Agreement (2005)). 
Finsen (2005), citing Kathmer Investments (Pty) Ltd. v Woolworths (Pty)
Ltd.1970 (2) SA 498 (A), points out that the provision thus also includes
“a dispute about any of the rights and obligations of either of the
parties under the Agreement”, as well as “a dispute as to whether
either party had breached the Agreement or not, and a dispute as
to whether a term of the Agreement should be rectified.” As the
dispute resolution clause survives the cancellation of the contract
(Cl.40.10), Finsen (2005) suggests that a dispute as to whether or not a
party which has cancelled the contract was lawfully entitled to do so
would come within the scope of this clause.
3.3 Performance management
3.3.1 Time management
Three criteria/descriptors are given in the Agreement that require the
execution of the works (Cl. 2.1) be carried out with speed: ‘diligence’,
‘regularity’ and ‘expedition’ (Cl. 15.3). No objective measures related
to these criteria, however, are provided in the Agreement, which
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leaves the employer without any direct or proactive means of
management and control over time. The contract JBCC Preliminaries
(2005) stipulates merely that the contractor ‘shall be responsible for a
programme for the works’ (Cl. 4.2 of the Preliminaries document), but
places no onus on the contractor to construct the works in
accordance with the programme or to update it at regular intervals
in accordance with actual progress on site. The Agreement,
however, does make express provision for the recovery of damages
(penalties) in a fixed amount per day in the event of delayed or non-
performance (Cl. 30.0). The employer is thus merely afforded a
remedy to recover any pecuniary loss suffered by reason of late
delivery (Cl. 33.1.1). The means of control is thus indirect and reactive. 
The employer also may not cancel the contract for reasons arising
from a general failure of the contractor to proceed with diligence,
regularity and expedition unless he or she has issued notice in terms of
the Agreement (Cl. 36.2). 
3.3.2 Cost management
The management of cost in the Agreement falls wholly outside the
contractor’s responsibility. The reason for this is that the employer
must prepare and provide the documents on which the contract of
agreement is based. The contractor merely tenders a price based on
these documents. After acceptance of the price, it is only the
employer who may vary its amount through instructions issued by the
principal agent (Cl.17.1). Cost, therefore, is the responsibility of the
employer and is thus not a performance measure under the
contract. 
Several other issues were identified in the Agreement that further limit
the employer’s control over cost:
• The contract sum ‘as stated in the schedule’ is recorded
merely for the purposes of contract. It does not establish
the employer’s obligation to the contractor. It is merely a
reference point (Finsen, 2005). The Agreement uses a
mechanism termed the ‘contract value’ that is equal to
the ‘contract sum’ as the instrument for varying the
change in cost. A review of the conditions for change in
the ‘contract value’ listed in the Agreement (Cl. 32) would
seem to indicate that there is no intention to fix the final
cost of the works at the outset;
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• There is no provision in the Agreement that obligates the
contractor to keep the employer informed on the current
financial status of the works. The employer is thus reliant on
the professional team for such information, which often
lags in the reporting process due to procedures and
timelines (Bowen & Edwards, 1996); and
• The employer’s control over cost is not direct. The
management of cost falls under the control and
administration of the employer’s principal agent who
enjoys an independent discretion in the exercise of his or
her duties (Cl. 38.1.7#). The Agreement records expressly,
that only the principal agent ‘shall determine the value of
adjustments to the contract value’ (Cl. 32.1). 
In practice, however, especially on contracts let with a high
proportion of prime cost/provisional sum items, and/or where the
project budget is under threat, it is not uncommon for the contractor
to play a significant role in assisting the principal agent to explore
ways and means to manage and control cost through alternative
specifications, designs, and/or building methodology. The
contractor, however, is under no contractual obligation to perform
this service.
3.3.3 Quality management
The descriptor/criterion used in the Agreement to define the
requirement for quality is the term ‘due skill’ (Cl. 15.3). No definition of
this term is given in the Agreement and reference must thus be made
to other reliable sources in order to gain a broad understanding of its
intrinsic meaning. Reference to Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English (1991: 985) suggests that ‘skill’ is defined as “a special ability to
do something well.” By implication this would require both a familiar
knowledge of the art or science necessary to undertake the task, as
well as the practical mastery required for its ‘execution’. The
qualification given to the type of skill required is that it shall be ‘due’
skill, that is a skill (or a standard of proficiency) demanded by the very
nature of the works to be executed. No objective measures for the
criterion, however, are given in the Agreement, which makes it very
difficult to decide in advance how quality will be managed and
controlled. The contractor must obviously produce a satisfactory
standard of workmanship, and the common law position in South
Africa is that the contractor must produce a standard of workmanship
that is of a similar standard to that produced by other competent
contractors working in similar circumstances (Finsen, 2005). 
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The Agreement does provide a contractual stipulation stating that
“the principal agent shall inspect the works from time to time to give
the contractor interpretations and guidance on the standard … of
the works” (Cl. 24.1.1). The obligation, however, does not extend to
supervision or responsibility for the works to ensure compliance. This
situation may be described as a divided responsibility (Rwelamila,
1996) and constitutes a breakdown in the communication process
necessary to maintain the link between the client’s expectations and
the final quality of the outcome of the works.
It should also be noted that there is a growing body of literature
critical of the reactive focus of operational techniques and activities
of ‘quality control’ and ‘quality assurance’ practices that have
become a primary source of problems facing the construction
industry globally (Rwelamila, 1996). Quality management in
construction, however, ideally requires the implementation of
systems that proactively minimise mistakes, and is not merely a bolt-
on system of inspection that must continually order remedial action
on completed work.
3.3.4 Risk Management
The most important risks assumed by the employer relate to the very
nature of the commercial venture to procure the works. As Stevens
(2001) points out, risk is an intrinsic attribute of construction and
property development. These risks could be defined as the risks
related to the strategic objectives arising from the investment /
business case. None of these risks, however, are explicitly defined for
management in the Agreement, and any provision for their
administration can only be inferred from the extent to which they are
included within the parameters of time, cost and quality inherent in
the contractor’s responsibilities for the ‘execution’ of the works. The
flaw in the risk management system under the Agreement therefore
appears to be its very separateness from the commercial context of
the overall strategic objectives for the project.
3.3.4.a)  The employer’s risks
Risks borne by the employer include those external risks listed as
uninsurable by the South African Insurance Associations Exceptions.
These risks include risks to the works arising from, inter alia, war, riot,
nuclear activity, confiscation, nationalisation or requisition by any
public or local authority (Cl. 8.5). Insurance for riot and related risks,
however, may now be insured through the South African Special Risks
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Insurance Association (SASRIA) and provision is made in the Schedule
to record the limit of liability should the employer elect that such
insurance be effected.
Other risks specifically excluded from the contractor’s responsibility
but that are internal to the project and fall on the employer (See Cls.
8.0 and 9.0). (with due regard to certain exceptions) include, inter
alia: 
• acts or omission of the employer, the employers servants or
agents and those for whose acts or omission they are
responsible (Cl. 9.2.1);
• an act or omission of a direct contractor appointed by the
employer (Cl. 9.2.2);
• design of the works where the contractor is not responsible
(Cl. 9.2.3);
• the occupation of any part of the works by the employer or
his tenants (Cl. 9.2.4); 
• the right of the employer to have the works or any part
thereof executed at the site (Cl. 9.2.5#); 
• interference with any servitude or other right that is the
unavoidable result of the execution of the works including
the weakening of or interference with the support of land
adjacent to the site unless resulting from any negligent act
or omission by the contractor or his subcontractors (Cl.
9.2.6#); 
• physical loss or damage to an existing structure and the
contents thereof in respect of which the Agreement is for
the alteration or addition to the existing structure (Cl. 9.2.7#);
• physical loss or damage to the contents of the works where
practical completion has been achieved (Cl. 9.2.8#);
• the use or occupation of the site by the works (Cl. 9.2.9#);
and
• advance payments where certified and duly made by the
contractor to nominated subcontractors or selected
subcontractors (Cl. 9.2.10#).
It should also be pointed out the employer is responsible for all the
contractor’s risks that exceed the amount of the contract works
insurance as may be stated in the Schedule (Cl. 8.4).
The contractor, however, has an explicit obligation to inform the
principal agent of any physical loss and damage that comes to his or
her attention (Cl. 8.7).
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3.3.4.b)  The contractor’s risks
The contractor’s listed risks relate to the risk of the works, from the
date of possession of the site to the date of practical completion. The
extent of the contractor’s risk in this regard includes the making good
of physical loss and repairing damage to the works (Cl. 8.3.1); the
replacement value of materials and goods supplied by the employer
to the contractor (Cl. 8.3.2), and the cost of additional professional
services of the employer’s agents. 
The contractor’s liability for risks, therefore, is wholly internal to the
Agreement in the execution of the works and is not explicitly focused
on any of the broader issues of procurement that could determine
strategic objectives.
3.3.4.c)  The professional advisor’s risks
Professional advisors under the Agreement carry the least risk for their
participation in the construction project, notwithstanding the
tremendous impact they are able to have on the project process,
both negative or positive. The reason for this in South Africa is
because of the doctrine of the privity of contract. Parties who are not
privy to a contract cannot sue or be sued on it (Christie, 2006).
Professional advisors, therefore, carry no contractual responsibility
derived from the Agreement for activities related to the execution of
the works. They are, however, responsible for the risks associated with
the execution of their own services and responsibilities to the
employer under separate agreement, and the employer’s internal
project risk is moderated to this extent.
3.3.4.d)  The reimbursement mechanism
In terms of the Agreement, the contractor is entitled to receive
interim payments (Cl. 31). This practice is a departure from South
Africa’s common law for the letting and hiring of work. In terms of
South Africa’s common law of locatio conductio operis, the
conductor operis is ‘normally obliged to carry out the work which he
is engaged to do before the contract money can be claimed’ (De
Wet & van Wyk, 1978: 138). The basis of this law is known as the
principle of reciprocity which requires that there should be an
exchange of performances between the parties to an agreement
(Christie, 2006). The contractor’s right to an interim payment,
therefore, is contractual. The fact that it is interim, however, does not
mean that it is made in settlement of the employer’s obligations for
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work done. This is an important point in favour of the employer in the
management of cost. The courts in South Africa have held that
interim payments made are merely advance payments against the
totality of work still to be done (Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liq) v
Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A)). This
means that interim payments are subject to revision on reasonable
grounds and may be amended in value at the time when future
interim payments are made, or at the time of determining the final
account. 
The amount certified is required to be a ‘reasonable’ valuation of the
total amount of work carried out to date, including variations, plus a
reasonable valuation of unfixed materials and goods, whether on or
off site, procured by the contractor for the works, less the total
amount previously certified and with Value Added Tax (VAT) added
to the resulting amount (Finsen, 2005). Finsen states, however, that
only the final certificate for payment is a liquid document. 
Interim payments are required to be calculated monthly and a
payment certificate issued (Cl. 31.1). The principal agent is not
permitted to omit the issue of the certificate for any reason, even if
the contractor has failed to bring the works to practical completion
by the date stated in the Schedule. The reason for this is that the
Agreement makes provision for the preparation and issue of a
‘recovery statement’ at the same time as the issue of the payment
certificate which, inter alia, makes provision for the recovery of
penalties levied in terms of Cl. 30 in the event of non-completion. The
payment certificate, therefore, may be for a nil or negative amount
as may be determined by the circumstances prevailing at the time of
issue, but it must still be issued in terms of the explicit requirements of
the Agreement.
With the exception of State contracts concluded in terms of the
Agreement, the level of control that the employer may exercise over
this process is again limited by the independent authority enjoyed by
the principal agent.
4. Project delivery using the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement: a case study
Details of the case study reported here are drawn from Richards et al.
(2005). A single case study approach was adopted as the project
involved the use of the standard JBCC Principal Building Agreement
between a contractor and a developer with a Development
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Agreement between the developer and the construction client. As
such it constitutes an ‘extreme’ or ‘unique’ case (Yin, 1994; United
States GAO, 1990) which, because of the existence of the two
agreements, highlights the shortcomings of JBCC Principal Building
Agreement in addressing the client’s strategic objectives in the way
the project process is made more complex when used alongside other
sets of agreements which more closely reflect those objectives. At the
time of the collection of the data, the contract for the project had
already been signed between the client and the developer, and
construction had been in progress for several months. 
4.1 The Client
The client is an established tertiary education institution in the public
sector that actively engages in education, training and research. The
client’s activities are funded through a combination of state funding
and fee income. Owing to the restructuring and changing priorities of
government, state funding for South African tertiary institutions is in a
state of flux with funding being re-directed to redress historical
imbalances with a consequent reduction in state subsidy to the client.
To succeed, tertiary institutions are adopting a more business-like
approach to management and marketing, boosting revenue by
increasing the number of students, rationalising courses offered,
enrolling more foreign students and entering into partnerships with the
private sector in commercially exploiting research. The client’s mission is
to be foremost in its areas of service in meeting the education needs of
South Africa within the parameters of government objectives, the
imperatives determined by industry, and the expectations of the
international community. 
The client’s strategy of increasing student enrolments and improving its
research facilities has led to a considerable construction programme
involving a number of new-build and refurbishment projects. In
addition, the existing built estate requires an extensive maintenance
programme. The client, therefore, commissions a steady stream of
small- to medium-sized projects with at least one major new
development every two to three years in the range of R30m to R50m
(R14.00 = 1 GBP, December 2006). Table 1 presents the client’s
construction procurement features and processes. 
Table 1: The Client’s construction procurement features and
processes
The categories of the construction work undertaken by the client with
their associated different business requirements are classed as new-
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build, extension/modification and maintenance/refurbishment. New-
build projects are affected by the limit of available funds. Research
Supply chain
The client maintains a separate department responsible for its
property development and maintenance programme. The
department is well staffed with its own project managers, architects,
engineers and quantity surveyors and it is able to manage projects
up to R5m. Projects larger than R5m are outsourced. 
Supply chain
relationship
The client maintains a database of service providers for professional
and construction services, and specialist suppliers. Inclusion on the
database is subject to a registration procedure. Selection of a
service provider for appointment to a particular project Is based first
on the State’s policy for black empowerment and preferential
procurement and thereafter follows an assessment of technical
competence, capacity, programme, and an understanding of the
client’s requirements. The client, therefore, outsources only to
preferred suppliers. Professional consultants are appointed more or
less on a rotation basis. Construction contractors and suppliers are
subjected to competitive tender.
Procurement
strategy
Construction management is the preferred route of procurement
for all projects under R5m. The main reasons for following this
organisational method of procurement are that it:
• Allows the client to have a single point of contact with the
supply base;
• Permits separate competitive tendering for all trade work 
packages and thus maximises cost savings;
• Affords an intimate understanding of market pricing;
• Strengthens the client’s strategic costs and value management 
systems; 
• facilitates fast-track programming, and thus early project 
delivery;
• builds internal capacity in regard to product development;
• facilitates lessons learnt which can be carried forward within 
the client’s organisation;
• is focussed on strategic objectives driven by the low allocation 
of monies in current annual capital expenditure budgets.
Projects above R5m are wholly outsourced under the separate 
and coordinated (i.e. traditional) procurement system using a 
single principal building contractor. 
Contractual
arrangements
Projects procured under the construction management model are
contracted in terms of the JBCC Minor Works Agreement (2005) for
each trade package. Outsourced projects are contracted in terms
of the JBCC Principal Building Agreement. 
facilities are funded mostly by money made available through grants
obtained locally or from abroad. The allocation of these funds is driven
by strong stakeholder interests. Student accommodation is procured on
the strength of the business case by contracting with a developer using
a lease back mechanism in order to avoid the need to raise large
amounts of development capital. There is a strong focus on whole life-
cycle costs on these projects rather than on initial capital cost.
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The client has definite generic strategic objectives for all its construction
procurement as shown in Table 2. However, specific strategic
objectives arising from the business case are identified and defined on
a project-specific basis. 




The client endorses the principles of:
• sustainable development, as enunciated in the constitution and thus
seeks to comply with all statutory provisions and guidelines governing
its own projects in the built environment;
• Sustainable construction, and has thus instituted an Environmental 
Management System (EMS) framework in accordance with ISO 
14001 for implementation on all their projects;
• The involvement of previously disadvantaged and marginalised 
sectors/individuals and thus procures its construction works in 
accordance with the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Act, No. 5 of 2000, and the targeted procurement policies 
developed by the Depart of Public works;
• a safe working environment for all its staff and external service 
providers appointed to work on its property, and thus seeks to 
comply with the provisions of the Health and safety Act, No 85 of 
1993, and the Draft Construction Regulations published in 
Government Gazette 23310 of 2002. 
Technological
objectives 
The client has developed standards for all construction materials and
finishes, building systems, installed equipment, and furniture and
fittings. The standards relate directly to whole life-cycle building costs
which must fall within defined parameters. 
Operational
objectives
Design functionality for all construction works must adhere to the
operational requirements of its various departments responsible for
the running and maintenance of its buildings after project
completion. 
Aesthetics
The client maintains its own aesthetics committee which is mandated
to ensure that all its buildings fit the context of the environment into
which they are placed. In this regard, the client also seeks to
cooperate with the aesthetics committees of other bodies, whether




The client seeks to develop and empower its staff and thus increase
its organisational capacity by the process of the development of its
own property. Objectives in this regard, are defined and undertaken
on a project specific basis.
Stakeholder
objectives
The client maintains a proactive relationship with all its regular
stakeholders and has constituted various forums in which to engage
with them on a regular basis. Project stakeholders are identified at
the inception of each project and their needs are identified for
negotiation in terms of project objectives.
Functional
objectives
Objectives related to time, cost, and quality are project specific and are
identified for management in terms on the investment/business case.
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4.2 The Project
The project was a new build student residence located on a piece of
land strategically purchased by the client some years prior to the
decision to build. The business case for the project arose from a
shortage of student accommodation. The business case suggests
that the annual cost of the lease offered by the developer who
would finance and build the new residence could be covered by
the normal accommodation rental paid by students. Demand from
end users was high and before the accommodation for the
residence was built it was fully subscribed. The success of the business
case, however, was premised upon gaining completion of the
student residence before the commencement of the academic
year. Failure to gain completion by that time would have several
significant consequences to the client:
• the loss of the enrolment of the students who had applied
for residence in the new facility, not only for the first
academic year, but also for the full period of time
intended for their studies; and
• the loss of the revenue for the whole facility for the first
twelve months of operation. The client regarded the
combined business risks as significant requiring proactive
management. 
Two contract agreement documents involved in the procurement of
the project are the Development Agreement between the
developer and the client, and the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement between the developer and the contractor.
The Development Agreement between the client and the developer
require the developer to:
• Construct and deliver the new student residence within
twelve calendar months from the date of handover of the
site by a predetermined date;
• Appoint design consultants formally approved of by the
client;
• Procure the construction works on the basis of the JBCC
Principal Building Agreement;
• Obtain prior written approval from the client before
making payments to the contractor; and
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• Effect handover of the completed residence based on a
final completion certificate issued by the principal agent
in terms of the JBCC Principal Building Agreement.
The agreement also required the client to enter into a fixed period,
and fully repairing, agreement of lease with the developer on
completion of the works. The design in which the outline design was
produced by the client and supply of a new residence building is in
accordance with the client’s brief.
The following section analyses both the Development Agreement
and the JBCC Principal Building Agreement to determine the
manner in which the client had articulated its strategic objectives for
the purposes of management, control and performance
measurement. 
4.3 Reconciling the Development Agreement and the
JBCC Principal Building Agreement
An inspection of the JBCC Agreement between the developer and
the contractor shows that it had been concluded without
amendment, and that it agreed with the material terms of the
Development Agreement signed by the developer and the client in
all respects. It would therefore seem logical that the objectives of the
client would be communicated to the contractor by the developer.
After all, any construction risk that the developer would bear would
sensibly be passed on to the contractor who is best placed to
manage that risk. Consequently, there ought to be a degree of
alignment between the two agreements. 
4.4 Principle Observations
On the basis of this proposition, the contractual arrangements were
evaluated for their suitability in meeting the client’s strategic
objectives as shown in Table 2 and a comparison of the two
agreements in achieving this is presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: Analysis of the strategic objectives identified in the Field
Study against the intrinsic provision made in the JBCC
Principal Building Agreement for their management,























construction No provision No provision Ditto.
Black
Empowerment No provision No provision Ditto.
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Safety Act Cl. 7 No provision
The obligation for Health
and Safety (H&S) in the
JBCC is placed on the
contractor (Cl.7). The
Regulations (2003),
however, shift the primary








Materials used must be fit-
for-purpose if not specified.
Building systems Employerspecification No provision
Systems used must be fit-
for-purpose if not specified.
Equipment Employerspecification No provision
Equipment installed must


















Contract only for works
execution.
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The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that neither contractual
arrangements supported the client’s strategic objectives. More
specifically, the JBCC Principal Building Agreement was not only at
variance with the client’s established supply relationship with the
developer, but it made no meaningful contribution to the
management and control of the client’s strategic objectives, nor did
it provide any basis for the measurement of project outcomes in
terms of these matters.
A review of all key planning documents and organizational systems
revealed how the JBCC Principal Building Agreement signed by the
developer and the contractor failed to meet the client strategic
objectives as there was:
• No evidence that a project organisation had been
purposefully designed to meet strategic project
objectives;



















objectives No provision No provision






















executed with ‘due skill’ to
a standard determined by
the principal agent.
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• No formal quality management plan for the project in
terms of the client’s technological objectives;
• No formal site safety management plan;
• No formal environmental management plan for the
control of construction activities in terms of ISO 14 001;
• No stakeholder management plan for the management
of project stakeholder objectives or relationships; and
• No formal procurement management plan in terms of the
client’s stated objectives for preferential procurement.
Following the review of the documentary evidence, interviews were
conducted on a semi-structured basis with the project manager and
the architect to explore these issues and to correlate and validate
specific findings. Both the developer and client were unwilling to be
interviewed, although the client provided the project documentation.
These documents confirmed the initial observation that the client’s
strategic objectives in terms of the socio-economic objectives and
corporate policy were not explicitly communicated to the team, nor
stated in the project documents made available to them.
Both interviewees opined the supply relationship between the client
and the developer prior to conclusion of the development
agreement as being collaborative in nature; a de facto joint venture,
where one party provided land and the other finance. Both
expressed surprised that the client subscribed to the JBCC Principal
Building Agreement. Both considered the supply relationship and the
contractual arrangement to be inappropriate for the achievement of
the strategic objectives of the client for the project because of the
number of unresolved issues that remained the start of the project.
Their opinion was that the JBCC Principal Building Agreement is only
appropriate where there is certainty in design information and where
the client is fully involved in the construction process. Both found that
the division of roles and responsibilities between the client and
developer in terms of their rights and obligations in respect of
outstanding matters to be completely inadequate as there is no
definition, nor any parameters for their resolution.
Two steps taken by the client and the developer to manage the
project for the client’s stated strategic objectives were identified by
the architect and project manager, namely:
• putting a completion date in the contract; and
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• the appointment by the developer of a professional
planner. 
Other than these, they were unaware of any specific measures or
steps taken to manage project risk in terms of the contract and that
performance criteria for the project were neither identified nor
defined.
An analysis of all the project documents provided yielded only one
clear client strategic objective, namely, project completion by the
date recorded in the Development Agreement. This objective was
reinforced by significant penalties. This would indicate that the
choice of supply relationship adopted by the client appears to have
been ill-considered for several reasons:
• The client procured the development by protracted
negotiation with a ‘single source’ supplier. The relationship
was highly collaborative from the start. Both the project
manager and the architect described the supply relation-
ship at inception as being akin to a ‘joint-venture’;
• The brief was incomplete at the date of contract. Both the
Development Agreement and JBCC Principal Building
Agreement suggesting that it was going to require sig-
nificant levels of joint working throughout the construction
period to ensure final product quality for project delivery;
• The nature of the agreement to proceed with the project
before contract was premised on a working relationship that
was destined to last for more than two decades; and
• A strong demand by client stakeholders that had impacted
on project scope. 
It would appear that the essence of the contractual arrangement
between the client and the developer was a ‘turn-key’ development
contract. The arrangement in which both the Development
Agreement and JBCC Principal Building Agreement were applied to
the project, however, proved unduly complex for several reasons:
• The client had bound the developer to procure the
construction works in terms of the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement and then, through the terms of the Develop-
ment Agreement, agreed to bind itself to accept project
completion based on a final completion certificate issued to
the developer by the principal agent (see Clause 26 of the
JBCC Principal Building Agreement) in terms of a
contractual arrangement between the developer and the
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contractor. The arrangement effectively precluded the
client from exercising any direct control over an event
intrinsic to its contractual rights under the Development
Agreement; and
• Explicit in the development agreement was an under-
standing the client would rely on all systems of management
and control intrinsic to the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement in order to satisfy its objectives. It should be
noted that the client’s interests in this regard are not
recorded in the construction agreement. The arrangement
again effectively precluded the client from exercising any
direct control over matters of immediate contractual right
under the Development Agreement.
The weakness in the development agreement was that the client
chose to rely on mechanisms of control privy only to the developer in
terms of its relationship with the contractor at the second tier of the
supply chain. The client clearly stood outside this contractual
relationship and left itself without any means to exercise its rights
under those terms. The client’s contractual position was thus greatly
weakened. It is postulated that this rather complex contractual
arrangement between the client, developer and the construction
contractor occurred because of a ‘thoughtless’ decision, possibly
driven by ‘over-familiarity’ or ‘trade-usage’ (Root & Hancock, 1996)
to make use of the JBCC Principal Building Agreement which is so
conveniently available to the construction industry.
It is clear that the reliance of the parties (and in particular the client)
on the JBCC Principal Building Agreement was born out of a certain
familiarity and confidence in its established use. Regretfully, the
approach of the parties prevented them from adopting a ready
mind to their own unique contractual requirements. Their attempt to
cure their commercial arrangements in terms of this agreement,
therefore, did much to weaken their contractual position with a
tendency to produce many oddities that could consequently lay the
foundation for serious conflict/dispute.
5. Conclusions
This article has shown that the South African JBCC Principal Building
Agreement deals only with the transaction to procure the built asset
(construction work) within the parameters of the time required for its
delivery, its cost, and the standard of quality to which it must be built.
Its focus, therefore, is placed on construction process and the
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description of the product required for project delivery. The limitation
of such a contracting method, in terms of the argument presented
thus far, would seem to indicate that the Agreement lacks utility for
the control of strategic objectives, or to establish the measures
necessary to evaluate their success. 
As a standard form document, JBCC Principal Building Agreement
makes no provision to deal with strategic objectives not met by its
philosophy, structure, or parameters. All other procurement issues
related to the strategic and organisational objectives of the
investment and business case that should be decided and
managed under appropriate parameters fall outside its structure and
control. This means that construction clients who use the document
for the benefit of its convenience are obliged to consider its
adequacy to manage strategic objectives within the wider sense of
the investment and business case. The document clearly prevents
the client from accurately expressing his or her specific project wishes
but rather merely moulds the client’s intentions into a prescribed
document. 
At present in South Africa there is the added focus of development
objectives that have been identified as strategic for the whole
country. The imperatives documented by government include the
creation of sustainable employment, skills development, affirmative
action, the active promotion of small and micro- enterprises, and the
development of public sector capacity to manage the delivery
process. Government policy requires that the construction industry
respond to these issues. 
These imperatives reinforce the strategic value of process over
product and should be reflected in the way the project is organised
overall and in the methods of implementation — a matter that is
clearly absent from the current version of the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement. Up until the present time, procurement emphasis has
been placed on awarding contracts to companies with a requisite
percentage of black equity shareholding. Recent market signals
indicate, however, that added weight is being placed on meeting
the country’s imperatives by operational practices within the
construction process. It has thus become more important to structure
the contractual framework accordingly and to determine
performance measures aligned with a uniquely developmental
approach which, in turn, is responsive to specificities, and the
resource base of the location in which it is to occur.
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6. Future research
The following suggestions are offered for further research: 
• Methodologies need to be developed to assist in the
examination of the appropriateness of the JBCC Agree-
ment to various client investment / business case scenarios;
• Alternative standard forms of contract should be developed
for the different procurement systems used in South Africa
(e.g., construction management, management
contracting, design and build, etc.);
• Mechanisms need to be developed for inclusion in the
Agreement to facilitate the management and control of
second-order objectives related to sustainable construction;
• Mechanisms need to be developed to facilitate holding the
principal agent and other agents contractually responsible
for the performance of their duties in respect of the exe-
cution of the works;
• An alternative mechanism(s) needs to be created to
reimburse the construction client for his or her loss where the
provision of a penalty on the contractor is inappropriate in
respect of non-completion;
• Alternative mechanisms need to be considered for inclusion
in the Agreement in order to control transactional behaviour
(e.g. joint working, financial incentives, etc.);
• Objective criteria need to be developed for the proactive
management of time and quality; 
• Mechanisms need to be developed to include cost
management as part of the contractor’s responsibility; 
• Mechanisms need to be developed to manage risk within
the Agreement that is intrinsic to the outcome of the
strategic objectives of the investment/business case; 
• Objective criteria need to be developed to ensure the
legitimacy of the nature of a ‘disagreement’ before it is
elevated to the status of a ‘dispute’; and
• Procedures need to be developed to ensure that a
disagreement is properly documented before it is referred
up to the next level of management in the organisations of
both contracting parties and/or third party determination.
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